Peter van Inwagen, GOD, KNOWLEDGE & MYSTERY: ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHICAL THEOLOGY by Howard-Snyder, Frances & Howard-Snyder, Daniel
Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers 
Volume 15 Issue 3 Article 15 
7-1-1998 




Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy 
Recommended Citation 
Howard-Snyder, Frances and Howard-Snyder, Daniel (1998) "van Inwagen, GOD, KNOWLEDGE & MYSTERY: 
ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHICAL THEOLOGY," Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers: Vol. 15 : Iss. 3 , Article 15. 
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol15/iss3/15 
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and 
creative exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. 
BOOK REVIEWS 397 
Stenmark's reluctance to allow "the primary scientific standard of pre-
dictability" to be applied at any point to religious belief (p. 309). Of 
course we cannot routinely test religious claims by putting them to a test 
in the lab, but it seems far from clear that applying the principle of pre-
dictability is always inappropriate. Jesus says to a paralytic, "That you 
may know the Son of Man has power on earth to forgive sins on earth, I 
say to you arise, take up your pallet and go to your house" (Luke 5: 24). 
Wouldn't the paralytic or a bystander be justified in assessing the 
hypothesis This person has the power to forgive sins in light of the predic-
tion The paralytic will rise, especially given that Jesus says "That you may 
know ... "? It is reported in the Acts of the Apostles (c. 5) that Gamaliel, a 
member of the Sanhedren, argued that if the work of the followers of 
Jesus was of men it would not succeed, but if of God, it could not be 
crushed. It is hard to see what is wrong with Gamaliel's way of reason-
ing or how this way of reasoning is not tantamount to proposing a 
testable hypothesis. And why couldn't one rightly reason that if partici-
pation in a church's life only seems to make people worse, then it proba-
bly is not of God? It might be objected that this is to treat religious 
beliefs as hypotheses; and whatever they are they clearly are not that. 
But as Stenmark himself observes when commenting on the refusal of D. 
Z. Phillips, Alvin Plantinga, and others to accept religious language as 
expressing hypotheses, even if there is something wrong about calling a 
settled conviction of a believer a "hypothesis," the proposition at issue 
can certainly be treated as one by a person only looking into the matter 
(p.325). 
Here and there, then, Stenmark burdens the main argument of his 
book with misleading statements and dubious contentions inessential to 
the case. Nonetheless, Rationality in Science, Religion, and Everyday Life is 
an impressive work, widely informed, penetrating, and on the main 
point quite convincing. 
God, Knowledge & Mystery: Essays in Philosophical Theology, by Peter van 
Inwagen. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1995. Pp. 284. $17.95. 
FRANCES & DANIEL HOWARD-SNYDER, Western Washington 
University & Seattle Pacific University 
This volume collects nine essays published by Peter van Inwagen 
between 1977 and 1995. Part I features, among other things, modal skep-
ticism with respect to ontological arguments and arguments from evil. 
Part II addresses certain tensions Christians may feel between modern 
biology, critical studies of the New Testament, and the comparative 
study of religions, on the one hand, and Christian orthodoxy, on the 
other. Part III deploys a formal logic of relative identity to model the 
internal consistency of the orthodox doctrines of the Trinity and the 
Incarnation. In what follows, we summarize and reflect on five essays.' 
"Ontological Arguments" focuses on valid arguments by that name 
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which claim or imply that a necessary, concrete being is possible. But 
how are we to tell whether necessary existence (N) is compatible with 
concreteness (C)? Conceptual analysis won't do, says van Inwagen; for, 
firstly, the compatibility of Nand C is not a conceptual matter and, sec-
ondly, even if it were, analysis would help no more than it would help 
settle whether '7777' appears in the decimal expansion of Te. Perhaps we 
should believe N is compatible with C anyway, since the possibility is 
not conceptually precluded; but, says van Inwagen, that's like arguing 
that we should believe that three-foot-thick sheets of iron could be trans-
parent to visible light since the possibility isn't conceptually preclud-
ed-which is absurd. More plausibly, perhaps we may rationally believe 
that Nand C are compatible, even though it is false that we should. This 
is Plantinga's line: without argument, we rationally believe that there is a 
possible world in which unsurpassable greatness is exemplified (which is just 
Nand C reved up with perfection) provided we still find it compelling 
upon examining objections. These conditions are insufficient for rational 
belief, argues van Inwagen (35-41). That was in 1977. In 1985, Plantinga 
wrote: "I hope sometime soon to reply to van Inwagen".2 Thirteen years 
later, we are still waiting. 
Van Inwagen concludes that, barring special revelation, we can't tell 
whether a necessary, concrete being is possible. This skepticism about 
extra-mundane modal matters-an affront to many, a breath of refresh-
ing candor to others-permeates the book. Lest it be dismissed as yet 
another heroic attempt by a theist to save his theism, we note that van 
Inwagen embraced it long before he became a Christian, he deploys it 
fairly and, he offers good reason for it 01-14, 19-21, 30-41, 79-86). 
In "The Place of Chance in a World Sustained by God," van Inwagen 
sketches a picture of God's relation to the world according to which ele-
mentary particles exist and have their causal powers because and only 
because God holds them continuously in existence and constantly sup-
plies them with these powers. Occasionally, God may miraculously sup-
ply these particles with different causal powers simply by "decree". 
How might chance fit into this picture? An event which is due to chance, 
says van Inwagen, is one which "is without purpose or 
significance; ... not part of anyone's plan; it serves no one's end; and it 
might very well not have been" (50). This seems odd. For if this is what 
chance is, you would not expect van Inwagen to classify events brought 
about by free human choices as chance events, which he does. This may 
not matter, however. For he is mainly concerned with events that are not 
part of God's plan, and free human choices fit that description. "God's 
plan" is the sum total of what God has decreed, excluding decrees 
issued in response to events that are not part of His plan. Within this 
picture, two sources of chance other than human free choice might arise: 
natural indeterminism and the initial state of the world. The latter idea is 
this: if two possible initial states of the universe-X and Y-could have 
served God's purposes equally well, then He decrees "Let either X or Y 
be," one of which results. Van Inwagen rejects the alternative-God's 
either decreeing "Let X be" or decreeing "Let Y be" -because if X and Y 
were equally satisfactory to God, then, if He chose X rather than Y, His 
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choice would be entirely arbitrary; but "J find it wholly incongruous to 
suppose that the Divine Nature contains anything remotely resembling 
a coin-tossing mechanism" (59). We don't see the alleged incongruity. 
Which perfection would be sullied if Cod were, by nature, disposed to 
decree arbitrarily between equally satisfactory states of affairs? 
Van Inwagen speculates that much is due to chance, incuding much suf-
fering. By itself, this does not solve the so-called problem of evil, but it does 
have the following moral: "Do not attempt any solution to this problem that 
entails that every particular evil has a purpose, or that, with respect to every 
individual misfortune, ... Cod has some special reason for allowing it." (65). 
This has important implications for arguments from evil that appeal to par-
ticu/ar horrors. For example, William Rowe and Bruce Russell argue that 
since God must have a reason to permit this fawn's or this child's suffering 
(or something comparably bad) and there is no such reason, God does not 
exist. Critics tend to question the second premise, but van Inwagen rejects 
the first. God need have no special reason to permit a particular horror, pro-
vided He has a general reason to permit a good deal of suffering. To sup-
pose otherwise is like supposing that even if a commander has a general 
reason to permit his soldiers to suffer, he must have a special reason to per-
mit that soldier's suffering. No one has replied to this point. That's under-
standable, however. Contrast the rhetorical power of "There is no reason for 
God to permit this fawn's being burned or that girl's being brutalized" with 
"There is no reason for God to permit a good deal of horrific suffering". 
"The Magnitude, Duration, and Distribution of Evil" offers a general 
reason for Cod to permit human suffering: God created us in His own 
image, rational and capable of loving Him. This love, our highest good, 
is impossible without the ability to withhold it. So to fit us for love of 
Himself, God gave us the power to reject Him. And that's what our 
ancestors did, thereby ruining themselves morally and intellectually. 
They began to harm one another and lost their aboriginal power to pro-
tect themselves from the potentially destructive forces of nonhuman 
nature. This condition-their wickedness and helplessness-has persist-
ed through all the generations, being somehow hereditary. 
One worry here is that Cod Himself exhibits the best sort of love and 
yet Cod can do no evil. But then, freedom to love and essential goodness 
are compatible; thus, God could have achieved the highest good for His 
creatures without permitting evil.' In response, one might distinguish 
love at its best in an essentially good divine being from love at its best in 
a creature made for love of Cod, and then argue that while the latter 
requires the ability to withhold love, the former does not, and hence that 
the worry is logically invalid. We've yet to see this line of thought 
worked out. Also, that wickedness is somehow hereditary is puzzling, espe-
cially if we think of it as genetic. It is not a nlltural consequence of a par-
ent's free choice that her child be genetically disposed to behave similar-
ly. To this, van Inwagen replies that "it is possible to construct models of 
the Fall according to which its hereditary aspect is due to the effects of 
unaltered genes operating under conditions for which they were not 
'designed'-namely, conditions attendant upon separation from Cod." 
Unfortunately, he leaves this tantalizing suggestion undeveloped. 
